We examine the effects of coordinated trade-tax reforms and isolated tariff reforms on market access, government revenue and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance. Moreover, we allow for this fraction of purchases to vary across markets, in the sense that the required amount of money balances per unit of value is different for each good. We show that: i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access ii) coordinated tariff-tax reforms are more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs and iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged might be welfare deteriorating.
Introduction
IMF's and World Bank's structural adjustment and stabilization programs often involve a reduction in trade taxes that is accompanied by an increase in consumption taxes.
1 For this reason, there has been a lot of attention paid to the welfare, revenue and market access effects of such trade-tax reforms. The results established in the trade and tax reform literature, noted below, have indubitably generated important policy implications. However, the theoretical work on these issues has so far been conducted exclusively within a non-monetary framework. A natural question therefore arises: How do trade-tax reform strategies affect welfare, market access, and government revenue when carried out in a monetary economy? The purpose of this paper is to re-examine these issues within a monetary framework. We consider isolated tariff reforms as well as two types of joint reform strategies that are very common in the literature: i) a reduction in import tariffs combined with an increase in consumption taxes so as to keep consumer prices unchanged, and ii) a reduction in export taxes combined with an increase in production taxes so as to leave producer prices unchanged.
In the existing trade and tax reform literature, the main result has been that reductions in import tariffs (export taxes) combined with increases in consumption taxes (production taxes) improve welfare and government revenue (see, among others, Michael et al. 1993 , Hatzipanayotou et al. 1994 , Keen and Ligthart 2002 . 2 This occurs because a tariff-tax reform that leaves consumer prices unchanged improves production efficiency, by reducing the excessive production of the importable goods, and at the same time increases government revenue, by reducing the implicit production subsidies. Likewise, an export and production tax reform that keeps producer prices unaffected improves consumption efficiency, by reducing excessive consumption of the exportable goods, and at the same time increases government revenue, by reducing implicit consumption subsidies.
Since market access plays an important role in trade negotiations, the recent literature has also analyzed the market access effects of tariff changes. 3 For example, Ju and Krishna (2000) show that tariff reductions that improve welfare may hurt market access. Anderson and Neary (2007) and Falvey and Kreickemeier (2008) 1 See, for example, IMF (2005) and Rajaram (1994) . 2 A notable exception is Emran and Stiglitz (2005) , who show that in the presence of an informal sector coordinated trade-tax reforms may reduce welfare. 3 Market access is defined as the value of imports at world prices.
1 identify tariff reform rules that ensure an improvement in welfare and market access.
Finally, Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) (henceforth KR) consider the welfare and market access effects of combined tariff-tax reforms and show that such reforms are less efficient in improving welfare and market access than simple tariff reductions alone.
The importance of analyzing what may seem as purely international trade issues within a monetary environment has been demonstrated by Palivos and Yip (1997a,b) , who derive the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas, respectively, in a generalized cash-in-advance model. They show that the presence of a cash-inadvance constraint may alter standard results in the international trade literature, by introducing a wedge between the relative prices of goods faced by consumers and the world relative prices that are still relevant to the domestic producers. In a similar framework, Chao and Yu (1999) investigate the shadow price of foreign exchange, whereas Yip (2000, 2001) re-examine the optimal trade policy in the presence of sector-specific unemployment and non-traded goods, respectively. Palivos and Yip (2006) determine the optimal trade policies in a monetary economy with endogenous labor supply and learning by doing.
This paper differs from the aforementioned literature in several aspects. First, it does not seek to characterize the optimal tariff or tax, which is the main concern of the money-trade literature; rather it takes as a starting point the existence of arbitrary levels of distortionary tariffs and/or taxes, as is the case in the trade and tax reform literature. Second, unlike the existing money-trade literature, it analyzes situations that involve more than one policy instrument. Third, it is concerned not only with welfare but also with the effects of trade and tax policies on government revenue and market access. Finally, the paper complements the tariff and tax reform literature in that it examines similar issues in the presence of liquidity constraints, which are important especially in developing countries. Also, we re-examine the welfare effects of another type of reform strategy, whereby a reduction in the export taxes is combined with an offsetting increase in production taxes so as to keep the producer prices unchanged. 5 In this case, we show that, again contrary to previous results, such a reform may lead to a decrease in welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 examines the effects of isolated tariff reforms and coordinated tariff-tax reforms on welfare and market access. Section 4 examines the welfare effects of export and production tax reforms. Section 5 concludes with a brief summary.
The model
Consider a small open monetary economy that produces and consumes tradable goods. Let one good indexed by zero ''0'' be the numeraire, 5 See Keen and Ligthart (2002) , Emran and Stiglitz (2003) , and Emran (2005) for this type of reform. 6 Note that more than one goods can be untaxed and serve as a composite numeraire good (see Emran 2005, and Anderson and Neary 2007) . 7 The numeraire good can be an importable good as well (see Emran 2005) . In fact, for reasons that will become transparent later, in Section 4 we assume that the non-numeraire goods are the exportable goods while the numeraire good is the importable. (1 ) , (1 ) , min : ( , ) and ( , ) R p p denote the revenue function; it gives the maximum value of domestic production given the domestic producer prices ( 0 , p p ). The equilibrium of this economy requires that total spending on goods and money holdings be equal to the income from production of private goods
plus the money supply
M , plus all tax revenue , which we assume that the government redistributes in a lump-sum fashion to domestic households, that is,
The government tax revenue is generated from three forms of taxes, namely trade, consumption and production taxes. We often refer to the last two forms as "domestic"
taxes. Thus,
where t γ τ = + denotes the total tax burden rate on consumption, and t λ ε = − is the total tax burden rate on production. Also, the partial derivatives of the expenditure function with respect to and , and , denote respectively, the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income and the compensated demand vector. Market access is defined as the value of imports at world market prices (Ju and
We conclude this section by deriving the effects of changes in trade and domestic taxes on government revenue, welfare and market access. Totally differentiating equation (2) we obtain ( )
where
+ τ and dp dt dε = − . Moreover, differentiating equation (1) and using equation (4), we have ,
where assuming that goods are normal in consumption. Finally, differentiation of equation (3) results in
Equations (4), (5) and (6) are the main equations of the model and are used to examine the effects of trade-tax reforms on government revenue, welfare and market access.
Tariff -Tax Reforms
In this section we examine reforms that involve i) only tariffs and ii) tariff and consumption taxes. We are interested in the effects of such reforms on welfare, government revenue and market access for the small open monetary economy, described in Section 2 above.
Tariff Reform
Consider a uniform radial reduction of all import tariffs, i.e., dt t θ = − , where θ is a small positive scalar, while consumption and production taxes remain zero (i.e., 0,
Then, with only tariffs dq dt = , dp dt = , t γ = , and
where it may be recalled that q and p denoted domestic consumer and producer prices, whereas γ and λ are the total tax burden rates on consumption and production, respectively. Using equation (4), the effect of a radial reduction of all import tariffs on welfare is
where (7) and (8) is a negative definite matrix.
12
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (7), we obtain ( )
Equation (7) Equation (8) indicates that a radial reduction of import tariffs has an ambiguous effect on government revenue. On the one hand, holding the level of imports constant, a radial reduction of tariffs reduces tariff revenues. On the other hand, a radial 12 The substitution matrix will be negative definite provided there is some substitutability between the numeraire good and at least one other good (see Neary 1998) . 13 For the intuition of this welfare-enhancing result of uniform proportional cuts in tariffs see footnote 2 in Ju and Krishna (2000) . They also provide intuition for another popular tariff reform rule, the socalled concertina rule. According to this rule, the highest tariff is reduced to next highest level, while holding all other tariff rates constant.
reduction of import tariffs may increase tariff revenues, because the level of imports rises.
Next we examine the effects of a radial reduction of import tariffs on market access. Solving equation (7) for du and substituting to equation (6) 
where (
is the marginal propensity to spend on importable goods and is assumed to be strictly between zero and one. If we set 0 14 In a monetary environment, however, as it can be seen after direct substitution in (9), this reform rule has ambiguous effects on market access. The following proposition summarizes our results in this sub-section.
Proposition 1. In a small open monetary economy, a proportional reduction of only tariffs has an ambiguous effect on welfare and will decrease it if: i) 0
x m φ φ δ > ⇒ < ,
and ii) the indirect effect (monetary distortion) outweighs the direct effect. Under the same conditions, a proportional reduction of tariffs alone according to the "JuKrishna rule" reduces market access.
14 Note that even though the "Ju-Krishna rule" increases market access, it cannot ensure welfare improvement. This result can be derived in terms of our notation by substituting 
Tariff-Tax Reform
Next we examine the implications of coordinated tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave all consumer prices unchanged, i.e., 0 dq = , holding production taxes constant. In the present context of domestic taxes and import tariffs, a radial reduction of all tariffs combined with an increase of all consumption taxes so as to leave the consumer prices unchanged, is dt θλ = , where λ is the vector of net production subsidies on the imported goods. Using equation (5) and that dt θλ = we obtain,
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (10), we obtain
Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994), Keen and Ligthart (2002) and KR have shown, within barter frameworks and with no production taxes, that a coordinated tariff-tax reform increases welfare and government revenue. Equations (10) and (11) indicate that this result is valid even in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements between the exportable and importable goods. Intuitively, since a coordinated tariff-tax reform leaves consumer prices unchanged, the monetary distortion introduced by the asymmetric cash requirements is neutralized. However, in the present context of production taxes in addition to import tariffs and consumption taxes, this result holds under the assumption that all imported goods are burdened with a net production subsidy.
Consider next the effect of coordinated tariff-tax reforms on market access.
Using equation (6) and taking into account that 0 dq = we obtain,
Using (10) to substituting for in equation (12) To complete this subsection, we consider now the effect on market access of a reduction of tariffs according to the "Ju-Krishna rule" combined with an equal increase of consumption taxes so as to leave consumer prices unchanged. According to the "Ju-Krishna rule" for the coordinated tariff-tax reforms, the reform is of the type , appropriately modified to take into account the presence of production taxes in addition to import tariffs and consumption taxes. By substituting this formula in equation (13) we obtain , and thus the "Ju-Krishna rule" increases import value in the present framework, under the assumption that all imported goods are burdened with a net production subsidy. We summarize these arguments in the following proposition. In the next subsection, we compare the welfare and market access effects of a tariff reform alone with those of a coordinated tariff-tax reform. This comparison is useful because it make obvious the difference between our results and those in KR.
Tariff-Tax Reform versus Tariff Reform
We compare the welfare effects of the two reforms in the case where the initial consumption and production taxes are zero. In this case it follows that t γ = and t λ = − . Subtracting equation (10) from equation (7) 
Setting 0
x m φ φ δ = = = in equation (14), the second term on the RHS vanishes and we obtain the result in KR, namely that in a barter economy a proportional reduction in tariffs leads to a higher increase in welfare than a proportional coordinated tariff-tax reform that keeps consumer prices unchanged.
The same result emerges in a monetary economy if 0 
w . (15) KR show that the reform of tariffs alone according to the "Ju-Krishna rule" increases market access by more than a reduction of tariffs according to the "Ju-Krishna rule" combined with an equal increase in consumption taxes. This can also be seen from equation (15) 
Export and Production Tax Reforms
In this section we examine how a reduction in export taxes with an offsetting increase in production taxes that keeps the producer prices unchanged ( ) affects the welfare of a small open monetary economy, when government revenue is financed by export and domestic (production and consumption) taxes. To facilitate the analysis we now assume that the numeraire good is the importable one. The domestic consumer prices of the non-numeraire goods are given by 0 dp = As shown by Keen and Ligthart (2002) and Emran (2005) , a reform that keeps producer prices unchanged increases welfare and revenue. 16 Intuitively, this occurs because an export tax is simultaneously a consumption subsidy and a production tax.
A reform strategy that leaves producer prices unchanged is equivalent to a reduction in the consumption subsidy at an unchanged production tax. Thus, the revenue increases because the cost of the subsidy has been reduced. In addition, this reform strategy is welfare-enhancing since it improves consumption efficiency by reducing excessive consumption of exportable goods. Thus, the overall welfare effect is ambiguous. To examine how a radial reduction of all export taxes combined with an equal increase in production taxes that keeps producer prices unaffected changes welfare and government revenue in the presence of a CIA constraint, set and 0 dp = dt θγ = − in equation (5) (1 )
Furthermore, using equations (4) and (16), we obtain
Equation (16) indicates that a reduction in export taxes with an offsetting increase in production taxes, so that the producer prices remain unchanged, has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements. The first term on the RHS of equation (16) denotes the standard direct effect that affects welfare positively, if all exported goods are burdened with a net consumption subsidy. The second term on the RHS denotes the indirect effect on welfare due to difference in 16 Emran (2005) considers a selective reform strategy where a reduction in export tax on a given commodity is offsetting by an equal increase in production tax. Emran and Stiglitz (2003) examine how a radial uniform reduction of all export taxes that is accompanied with an equal increase of production taxes that leaves producer prices constant affects welfare. They show that this radial reform increases welfare and revenue unambiguously. However, in the presence of an informal segment in the economy, this radial reform may be welfare and revenue reducing.
cash requirements between exportable and importable goods. The sign of this term is ambiguous and depends on the size of x φ relative to that of m φ . In particular, if the cash-requirement ratio for purchasing the exportable goods is higher than the cashrequirement for purchasing the importable good, i.e., 0
x m φ φ δ > ⇒ > , then this second term is negative. Thus, the overall welfare effect depends on the relative strength of the two opposing effects.
Equation (17) indicates that this type of reform raises government revenue even in the presence of asymmetric cash requirements. However, in the current context of consumption taxes in addition to export and production taxes, a sufficient condition for this type of reform to increase government revenue is that all exported goods are burdened with a net consumption subsidy. The results derived so far in the literature depend critically on the assumption that there are no financial constraints in the economy. Our results show that, when financial constraints are taken into account then the reduction of all export taxes combined with an equal increase in production taxes so as to leave producer prices unchanged may reduce welfare. Thus, the existence of 'win-win' reform strategies in a monetary economy depends crucially on the nature of the CIA constraint for purchasing goods.
Conclusions
A voluminous theoretical literature examines the welfare and revenue effects of coordinated tariff-tax reforms. Recently considerable attention has been paid also to the market access effects of reform strategies. Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Moller (2008) have shown, within a barter economy, that coordinated tariff-tax reforms are less efficient to improve market access and welfare than reforms that involve only tariffs.
In this paper, we have extended the analysis of Kreickemeier and RaimondosMøller (2008) for a generalized cash-in-advance economy. We have shown that the existence of a financial constraint weakens and may reverse the results in KR.
Moreover, we show that if the exportable goods are more liquidity constrained then tariff-tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged increase welfare and may increase market access by more than the reforms of only tariffs. Also, in the presence again of a financial constraint, a reform strategy that leaves producer prices unchanged may be less desirable or even undesirable if the exportable goods are more liquidity constrained.
Trade and tax reform policies are among the conditions that are widely used in IMF's and World Bank's structural adjustment and stabilization programs for developing countries. This paper has shown that accounting for a financial constraint, a typical feature of developing economies, is not just a theoretical curiosity and can have profound implications regarding the effects of such programs.
